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ATTITUDES TO CREDIT IN BRITAIN,
1680-1790*
JULIAN HOPPIT
University College London
The history of economic ideas in Britain is dominated by a great tradition
which in its early stages focuses on Adam Smith. For the century before the
publication of the Wealth of nations in 1776, economic ideas are most often
studied in relation to the 'arrival' of Smith and commented on with regard to
the degree to which they may be considered precursors of his ideas. Though
this imposes a sense of order and establishes some principles with which to select
from the vast range of economic writings, the dangers of certain whiggishness
in this approach are readily apparent. Writers can appear to be winners or
losers depending on the extent to which their ideas were denied, adapted or
adopted by Smith and the other classical economists.1 Such problems have
been acknowledged by many historians, not least by those who have fruitfully
examined the political and philosophical bases of the emergence of political
economy, particularly with regard to the Scottish enlightenment.2 Despite
this, the force of the great tradition remains very strong. The authors and ideas
that are examined are the 'major' ones, that is to say contributions that were,
or attempted to be, either comprehensive or clearly attached to what, with
hindsight, were the main strands of development. The emphasis has been upon
theories or systematic explanations of the economic order.3 Not surprisingly the
unsystematic and more casually formulated reflections of non-economists and
'amateurs', such as Defoe, are often swept under the carpet, even if their ideas
on economic matters were more widely disseminated (and perhaps more
influential) at the time. Consequently, our perception of economic ideas
between the Restoration and the Wealth of nations continues to be highly and
perhaps atypically selective.
One way of moving beyond this approach, examining more broadly the
* I wish to express my thanks to Donald Coleman, Joanna Innes and to the Clark Memorial
Library, Los Angeles.
1
 Douglas Vickers, for example, in his valuable book, Studies in the theory of money i6go-ijy6
(1959), p. 7, wrote that ' I t is not our purpose to present an exhaustive treatment of the theory
of money between 1690 and 1776. We shall endeavour to establish, on the other hand, new and
historically more meaningful categories of thought and to exhibit the mainstream of development.
A selection had been made of the more important authors, either for their influence on
contemporary thought or for the inherent worth and scientific importance of their contributions.'
2
 See, for example D. Winch, Adam Smith's politics (Cambridge, 1978); I. Hont and M. Ignatieff
(eds.), Wealth and virtue: the shaping of political economy in the Scottish enlightenment (Cambridge, 1983).
3
 This was the guiding principle in W. Letwin's investigation, The origins of scientific economics:
English economic thought 1660-1776 (1963).
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production and reception of economic ideas at the time, is to abandon
hindsight and explore as widely as possible reactions to those specific economic
problems which most preoccupied contemporaries, such as poverty and
unemployment, luxury and consumption, protection and free trade and credit
and debt. This article adopts this approach by exploring contemporary
reactions (not theories) to the use and abuse of credit over the period
1680-1790. Those reactions demonstrate the existence of a level of discourse
about economic issues which though less than fully theoretical was far from
being random or arid. Such ideas appear to have impinged deeply and
profoundly on the consciousness of polite society and illustrate therefore some
key aspects of their economic mentalite. Indeed, to the ordinary literate citizen
it was through issues such as the use and abuse of credit that broader aspects
of economic activity at the time were considered and articulated.
I
Any person or group needing money to exploit an opportunity or to meet a
need has four choices: to draw on reserves; to increase current income; to
reallocate resources; or to borrow. Yet it often happens that reserves are small,
reallocation impossible and the ability to increase income limited, leaving
borrowing as the only means forward. And so it frequently was in England
between the late seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries; the growth of both
the government and the economy was intimately connected to borrowing. All
types of loans became much more common. Discussion of borrowing and
lending also flourished, with the terms set largely in relation to a perceived
'problem of credit'. Credit, its form and function, givers and takers, risks and
rewards, loomed large in the literate consciousness.4 Yet it was judged as much
by moral and ethical standards as a simple cost-benefit analysis based on
financial or economic criteria. As such, attitudes towards credit in these years
provided a further instalment in the centuries-old process by which traditional
beliefs, hopes and fears were confronted by economic 'logic', illustrating the
sorts of worries contemporaries had about what some historians have called
'Britain's rise to greatness'.
The use of credit was already reasonably common in England by the middle
of the seventeenth century, but between 1680 and 1790 its extent and forms
multiplied considerably. Developments took place at three levels: public,
corporate and private. A so-called 'financial revolution' in government
4
 There was also a 'problem of debt' which will not be discussed in this article. See J. Hoppit,
Risk and failure in English business 1700-1800 (Cambridge, 1987), chs. n, m, x; J. Innes, 'The Kings
Bench prison in the later eighteenth century', in J. Brewer and J. Styles (eds.), An ungovernable
people (1980), pp. 250-98; P. H. Haagen, 'Eighteenth-century English society and the debt law',
in S. Cohen and A. Scull (eds.), Social control and the state (Oxford, 1983), pp. 222-47; P. J.
Lineham, 'The campaign to abolish imprisonment for debt in England 1750-1840' (unpublished
M.A. dissertation, University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 1974); R. L. Brown, 'The minters of
Wapping: the history of a debtors' sanctuary in eighteenth-century east London', East London
Papers, xiv, 2 (1972), 77-86.
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funding after 1688 saw the birth and early infancy of the permanent national
debt, where future revenues were mortgaged to raise money to pay for
expensive wars. Public credit was being widely tapped.5 At the corporate level,
large numbers of joint-stock enterprises emerged in the early 1690s and in the
late 1710s, connected to all manner of schemes.6 This expansion was halted by
the Bubble Act 1720 and future corporate enterprises were mainly restricted
to the building of the turnpikes and the canals. In private finance credit
instruments, such as bills of exchange, gradually became universal; in the last
third of the eighteenth century country banks were established; and outside
trade, consumers increasingly turned to credit such as annuities and pawning.7
All in all, from the Restoration to the outbreak of the French revolutionary
wars an increasingly well-organized and pervasive pattern of credit was
established, allowing consumers and producers to spend now and pay later.
Naturally enough this intensified dependence upon credit was questioned
by contemporaries. A flow of comments, sometimes slow sometimes fast,
testified to its new prominence and its attendant opportunities and problems.
Indeed, many (in parliament, coffee-houses, churches, chapels, newspapers
and pamphlets) saw credit as one of the defining characteristics of the age.
Examining it, consequently, was one route by which the achievements and
failings of a changing society, economy and mode of government could be
assessed. Hitherto, historians have only discussed the contemporary reaction
by looking at the debate surrounding the financial revolution in government
funding in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The writings of
Professor Pocock have been especially important here, showing how reactions
to the utilization of public credit were based on ideas of virtue whose lineage
can be traced back to Renaissance civic humanism.8 But it would be wrong to
think that all discussion of credit in the eighteenth century took place
exclusively within the political sphere. What is striking is that concern at all
the three levels of credit revolved around a common set of issues.
Crudely put, discussion of credit in this period was either polemical, largely
concerned with broad issues, or practical, largely concerned with more specific
matters, though they were never clearly separated and a number of problems
were pursued by both routes. Polemicists frequently concerned themselves
with issues of virtue, corruption, power, passions, stability, justice, fairness and
faith. Those who paid attention to the practicalities of credit were more
concerned with issues such as interest rates, risk-taking, financial instability,
economic efficiency and indebtedness. The issues were complicated still
further because credit was not homogenous, indeed there were many types of
5
 P. G. M. Dickson, The financial revolution in England (1967).
6
 W. R. Scott, The constitution and finance of English, Scottish and Irish joint-stock companies to iyio (3
vols., Cambridge, 1910-12).
7
 P. Mathias, 'Capital, credit and enterprise in the industrial revolution', in P. Mathias, The
transformation of England (1979), 85-101; L. S. Presnell, Country banking in the industrial revolution
(Oxford, 1956).
8
 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian moment (Princeton, 1975), chs. xm, xiv; idem, Virtue,
commerce, and history (Cambridge, 1985).
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credit within each of the three levels. Most discussion was prompted by the use
of particular forms of credit within one of the levels and, therefore, tended to
be stimulated by short-run rather than structural considerations. Specific
contexts have to be recreated to understand attitudes to credit at the time. Key
moments were usually associated with the considerable use of a novel form of
credit, often in a speculative way, perhaps leading to loss of confidence and
some form of crisis, as in 1720 with the South Sea Bubble or 1772 and the
collapse of large numbers of networks of bills of exchange. These crises, most
commonly financial crises, raised many questions about the usefulness of
credit, for at those moments what had previously seemed only to promise good
was shown to have a darker, destructive side. Public, corporate and private
credit were all prone to such crises, though those in the public and corporate
areas were most common before 1760 and those in the private area were
powerful only after about 1770.9 Inevitably, because it was crises that
prompted discussion, the opponents of credit tended to set the preliminary
limits to debate and could more easily hold the high moral ground. Defenders,
on the other hand, had to justify a system that was at that moment in a
shambles. In what follows the ideas of the critics will be discussed first before
turning to those who defended credit.
II
In no decade between 1680 and 1790 were there more crises than in the 1690s.
During those ten years England was racked by political instability, war,
financial innovation at the public and corporate levels, speculative manias, a
massive recoinage and a financial crisis of some magnitude. It was in this
unique environment that the first concerted discussion of credit took place.
The Glorious Revolution committed Britain to continental warfare and the
considerable financial demands on the exchequer could only be satisfied by
innovation. Consequently, the Hearth tax was replaced by the Land tax in
1692 and customs and excise were both reformed; a permanent national debt
was begun at the same time.10 But war and its financial consequences were not
the only factors behind discussions of credit in the 1690s. In particular, there
were strong speculative forces at work in the corporate environment,
manifested first in the 'patent boom' from June 1691 to October 1693, where
funds made idle by the war sought a resting place in projects. As Christine
MacLeod has put it , ' There was a fever of speculation... The ingenuity of City
sharks was put to devising instruments for dealing in stocks and shares that
transformed the comparatively sober transactions developed in trading
9
 Typologies of such crises are discussed in J. Hoppit, ' Financial crises in eighteenth-century
England', Economic History Review, xxxix, 1 (1986), 39-58.
10
 W. P. Kennedy, English taxation 1640-1799 (1913), pp. 45-6; R. Davis, 'The rise of protection
in England 1689-1786', Economic History Review, xix, 3 (1966), 306-17; Dickson, Financial
revolution; D. W. Jones, War and economy in the age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 1988);
J . Brewer, The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688-1783 (1989).
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company business into a series of wagers more akin to Newmarket races. ' n
Old corporations like the East India, Royal African and Hudson Bay
companies saw their stock traded more frequently than ever before and new
companies appeared in large numbers. Between 1689 and 1695 the number of
joint-stock companies rose from 11 to 93 in England (and 47 in Scotland),
though many of these were picked off in the financial crisis of 1696-7, a crisis
brought on by the collapse of the speculative forces, the large remittances to
the continent to pay for the war, the recoinage of 1696 and the run of bad
harvests from 1695-7.12
From this turmoil emerged many of the reactions to credit that were to
characterize discussion through the whole of the eighteenth century. Stock-
jobbers were the focus of attention and, not surprisingly hostility was the
initial reaction, much of it directed towards attempts to enact legislative
controls. In March 1694 a bill against stockjobbing was prepared, though it
failed. Two years later there was another unsuccessful attempt before, in 1697,
two statutes were passed which tried to regulate the activities of brokers.13 The
antipathy that was felt was well expressed in a report of the Commissioners
appointed to look into the trade of England, presented to the house of
commons on 24 November 1696.
The pernicious Art of Stock-jobbing hath, of late, so wholly perverted the End and
Design of Companies and Corporations, erected for introducing, or carrying on, of
Manufactures, to the private Profit of the first Projector, that the Privileges granted to
them have, commonly, been made no other Use of, by the First Procurers and
Subscribers, But to sell again, with Advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the
Reputation, falsly raised, and artfully spread, concerning the thriving State of their
Stock: Thus the first Undertakers, getting quit of the Company, by selling their Shares
for much more than they are really worth, to Men allured by the Noise of great Profit,
the Management of the Trade and Stock comes to fall into unskilful Hands...14
Stockjobbing was here accused of allowing, indeed encouraging, the free rein
of passions like avarice, passions which could only be satisfied by resort
to artfulness and underhand dealings. Corporate credit was tainted by
speculation at best or gaming at worst and, through unscrupulous projectors,
to extortion and oppression. The wealth and income associated with such
projects were viewed as transient and insubstantial, not permanently
invigorating. One onlooker complained of the ' Knavery, now in Vogue and
11
 'The 1690s patent boom: invention or stock-jobbing', Economic History Review, xxxix, 4
(1986), 549, 560.
1 !
 D. C. Coleman, The economy of England 1450-1750 (Oxford, 1977), p- 170; Scott, Joint-stock
companies, I, 327, 347-50; K. G. Davies, 'Joint-stock investment in the later seventeenth century',
Economic History Review, iv, 3 (1951-2), 292; J. K. Horsefield, British monetary experiments 1650-iyw
(i960), chs. 1, 2, 4—6; D. W.Jones, 'London merchants and the crisis of the 1690s', in P. Clark
and P. Slack (eds.), Crisis and order in English towns 1500-iyoo (1972), pp. 316-19; W. G. Hoskins,
'Harvest fluctuations and English economic history, 1620-1759', Agricultural History Review, xvi,
1 (1968), 16. 13 Dickson, Financial revolution, p. 516.
14
 Commons Journals, xi, 595. See also H. Horwitz (ed.), The parliamentary diary of Narcissus Luttrell
i6gi-i6g3 (Oxford, 1972), p. 147 for an attack on stockjobbers in 1692.
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Practice' and of the 'foul Dealers calling themselves Shrew'd Men...as if
Wisdom and Wit consisted in Sharping and Over-reaching each other'.15
Furthermore, the Commissioners noticed how stockjobbers diverted funds and
exploited a quasi-monopolistic position, distorting the market and enabling
them to charge unjust prices.
Many of these criticisms of corporate credit were used second-hand in
the debate over public credit and the national debt which dominated
discussion of credit between 1698 and the middle of the 1730s. A familiar run
of concerns can be identified: stockjobbers, monopolies, speculation, unreal
wealth and chaos. In part, of course, this was because three of the greatest
corporations, the Bank of England, the East India Company and the South
Sea Company, were intimately connected with the financial revolution. As
with corporate credit comment was most frequently invoked when credit was
collapsing, in 1701, 1710, 1720 and 1731—2.16
Critics argued that there were four deleterious consequences of the
exploitation of public credit.17 The first was that financiers amassed substantial
fortunes on the backs of a high land tax. More than that, these men were
thrusting and ambitious, 'So that Power, which, according to the old Maxim,
was used to follow Land, is now gone over to Money.'16 The old social and
political order was being undermined. Second, critics warned of the connection
between extensive and intensive use of public credit and corruption.19 It was
public credit which allowed prolonged wars, supporting a vast military
establishment where abundant promotions and places were at the disposal of
the government and Crown. Critics also complained of the corruption of well-
placed officials indulging in insider trading and of the prominent role of the
three great monopoly companies in the organization of the national debt.
Monopolies, of course, had been the butt of many criticisms through the
seventeenth century and were generally believed to overcharge for their goods
15
 Angliae Tutamen: or the safety of England (1695), PP- 3~4-
16
 In 1731-2 there was not a financial crisis but the discovery of a massive fraud of the
Charitable Corporation. This corporation had gained a charter in 1707 to raise share capital to
lend on pledges to the industrious poor. Its failure stymied future attempts to set up some
government-backed alternative to the pawnbrokers. See A. J. G. Cummings,' The York Buildings
Company. A case study in eighteenth century corporation mismanagement' (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, University of Strathclyde, 1980), ch. 6; S. Lambert (ed.), House of Commons Sessional
Papers of the Eighteenth Century, 145 vols. (Wilmington, Delaware, 1975), xiv; J. M. Bulloch, 'The
Charitable Corporation', Motes and Queries January-June 1931), pp. 237-41.
17
 These criticisms have been well covered in Dickson, Financial revolution, ch. 2; Pocock, The
Machiavellian moment, chs. xm, x iv ; idem, Virtue, commerce and history; I. Kramnick, Bolingbroke and
his circle: the politics of nostalgia in the age of Walpole (Cambridge, Ma, 1968); C. Robbins, The
eighteenth century commonwealthman (Cambridge, Ma, 1959); H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and property:
political ideology in eighteenth-century Britain (1977); C. Brooks, 'Taxat ion, finance and public
opinion, 1688-1714' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1970).
18
 J. Swift, The Examiner, ed. H. Davis (Oxford, 1957), p. 5, 2 Nov. i7 io ;T. S. Ashton, Economic
fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 116-17.
19
 In Pope's words, 'Blest paper-credit! last and best supply!/That lends Corruption lighter
wings to fly!' A. Pope, 'Epistle to Lord Bathurst' (1733), i n j . Butt (ed.), The Twickenham edition
of the poems of Alexander Pope, 11 vols. (1940-69), m, pt. 2, 90.
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and services.20 Third, some complained that the relative balance of security
and rates of return on offer in the national debt diverted money away from
useful, productive employment towards excessively expensive wars or con-
spicuous consumption. Sir John Barnard, the independent M.P. and Lord
Mayor of London, thought 'The Publick Debts encourage IDLENESS, the
Mother of Luxury. '21 For many, drawing on a long heritage of ideas, there was
no surer sign of national decay and moral degeneracy than the presence of
luxury in the nation.22 Fourth, there were very intense fears about stockjobbing
and 'bubbles'. Together they showed the unreality of wealth and value
associated with public credit, the power of nouveau riche schemers and the
force of speculation rather than sedate, honest endeavour. In 1701 Defoe
complained that 'we can now reckon up a black list of 57 Persons, who within
this ten years past have rais'd themselves to vast Estates... by the sharping,
tricking, intreaguing, scandalous Employment of Stock-jobbing'.23 In 1721
one author listed 107 bubbles with a nominal stock of £a,3-6m and which
eventually lost £i4 '0 m.24
Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, when it was clear that the
national debt was reasonably permanent, these charges were joined by the fear
that the national debt might bankrupt the country. In fact, polemics gave way
to a much more pragmatic approach, though the odd siren call was still to be
heard.25 In particular, attention shifted to discuss the size and form rather
than the existence of the national debt. Writers like Davenant and Sir John
Barnard had addressed such issues earlier in the century, but with the War of
the Austrian Succession (1739-48) and particularly the expensive Seven Years
War (1756-63) the problem of indebtedness became widely discussed. In 1742
it had been noted that 'if we go on contracting new Debts in every war we are
engaged in... our Publick Credit must break at last; for the strongest Cable
may be broke by over-stretching'.26 This was to become a commonplace, and
not just among those of an inherently backward looking or conservative
disposition. Hume thought that to contract large debts and to trust to a future
ability to repay was improvident and foolhardy; he too speculated on the
20
 For example , An appeal to the people of England, the publick companies and monied interest, on the
renewal of the charter of the Bank ( 1742) , p . 13.
21
 Reasons for the more speedy lessening the national debt, and taking off the most burthensome of the taxes
( 1 7 3 7 ) ; G . Berkeley, An essays towards preventing the ruin of Great Britain (1721) in T . E . J e s s o p ( ed . ) ,
The works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, 9 vols. (1953), vi, 76, offers a similar equation, this
time in the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble.
22
 J . Sekora , Luxury: the concept in western thought, Eden to Smollett (Ba l t imore , i o . 7 7 ) ; S . M . W a d e ,
'The idea of luxury in eighteenth-century England' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University, 1968). a3 D . Defoe, The villainy of stock-jobbers detected ( 1701) , p . 26.
24
 A. H a m m o n d , A modest apology, occasioned by the late unhappy turn of affairs, with relation to publick
credit (1721) , p . 28.
25
 The national debt was described by Lord Elibank as 'a gangrene in the commonwealth, and
will submit to nothing but amputation... The public debt has opened the iniquitous traffic of
stockjobbing, and introduced a spirit of gaming amongst all degrees of men.' P. Murray, An inquiry
into the original and consequences of the publick debt (1754) .
26
 [ W . P u l t e n e y ] A proper answer to a bystander ( 1742) , p p . 2 9 - 3 0 .
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likelihood of national bankruptcy.27 Even Adam Smith, a so-called modern, -,
was not optimistic here. 'The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled
every state which has adopted it.' He went on, ' Great Britain seems to support
with ease, a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable
of supporting. Let us not, however, upon this account, rashly conclude that she s
is capable of supporting any burden; nor be too confident that she could ;
support, without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has already V
been laid upon her.>28 Bankruptcy would not just be disastrous, it would load •
the state with a stigma that would not easily be lifted. ~l
Before the middle of the eighteenth century discussions of credit were
preoccupied with public credit, though the ideas employed and concerns •
expressed were often linked to the worlds of corporate and private credit. After
mid-century, particularly after 1770, private credit was centre stage, at least,
that is, until the 1790s, when the enormous growth of the funding system
provoked the wrath of Paine, Cobbett and others. As had happened earlier in
the century, discussion of private credit came and went over the short term,
with a string of financial crises (1772, 1778, 1788 and 1793) in the business
world prompting a revival of old fears and the formation of new ones.29
Private credit took many forms and was used for a wide variety of purposes.
Broadly speaking, however, the use of credit for personal consumption can be
distinguished from that used in the production of goods and services. The
former comprised personal or consumer credit, given by shopkeepers or
moneylenders, such as pawnbrokers, to private individuals. Among the latter
the most important was trade credit such as book debts, bills of exchange or
accommodation notes, all extensively used by businessmen.30 Indeed, the
dependence of businessmen on these devices was considerable. As Defoe put it,
'credit is so much a tradesman's blessing, that 'tis the choicest ware he deals
in.'31
Personal credit received a bad press in the eighteenth century. It was
frequently said that it was wrong to go into debt simply to pay for everyday
consumption goods. A cash economy was celebrated and the virtues of
prudent housekeeping and parsimony extolled. Consequently, retail credit,
pawnbroking and moneylending were all attacked, with both borrowers and
27
 D . H u m e , Essays, moral, political and literary (1903) , p p . 356, 369.
28
 A. S m i t h , An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, ed. E. C a n n a n (Chicago,
1976), n , 4 6 5 - 6 . See also for this per iod R. Price, An appeal to the public on the subject of the national
debt (1772). Adam Smith had helped Townsend in 1766-7 with a study of the sinking fund and
the state of the national debt. See W. R. Scott, 'Adam Smith at Downing Street, 1766-7',
Economic History Review, vi, i (1935-6), 79—89. Price played an important part in discussions over
the national debt in the 1770s and 1780s. See D. O. Thomas, The honest mind: the thought and work
of Richard Price (Oxford, 1977), ch. XII.
29
 O n the different charac ter of these crises see Hoppi t , 'F inanc ia l crises', pp . 55-6 .
30
 T h e r e were also, of course, mortgages and bonds, but these mostly avoided comment ,
p robably because of the qual i ty of the security a t tached to the loans and because they were
connected to the vir tuous pursui t of estate improvement .
31
 D . Defoe, The complete English tradesman (1726), p . 225. He thought (p. 416), that two-thirds
of English t rade was conducted by credit.
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lenders the targets. Moreover, this hostility was not socially specific and
reserved for the improvident poor. The rich and famous were widely
criticized; indeed, bigger fish made bigger splashes.32 As James Raven has
recently shown, there was much concern in the 1770s and 1780s about wealth
holding and conspicuous consumption, especially connected to the returning
nabobs and the emergence of wealthy businessmen.33 One frequent pre-
occupation in this environment was the connection between gambling and
credit throughout polite society. To some 'the love of gambling be the mortal
disease of the present age. '34 Edmund Burke was clear that the government
ought 'to make Systematick war against Gaming. Whilst it naturally allies
with every other Vice Gaming is the most destructive of them all. It is but too
natural a Vice... its bottom is laid in avarice; joined to restlessness of Temper;
and impatience of our present Situation.'35
Simple retail credit, from the shopkeeper to the customer, was widely
tolerated, though there were some critics.36 Indeed, acknowledging the growth
of this sort of credit, provision for the recovery of small debts was hesitantly
improved, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century.37 At the
very least, the vicissitudes of employment meant that consumers needed credit
from shopkeepers to tide them over a shortfall of income. If shopkeepers were
not criticized the same cannot be said of pawnbrokers and Jewish
moneylenders, who were castigated for encouraging stupidity, avarice and sin
and for charging extortionate rates for their money.
Pawnbrokers were not new to England in the eighteenth century, but they
certainly grew in number and prominence in the fertile soil of population
growth, urbanization and changing patterns of consumption. By the end of the
century there were 213 licensed pawnbrokers in London and 431 in the rest
of Great Britain, though this probably understates significantly the number of
all pawnbrokers.38 The number of Jewish moneylenders is impossible to state,
32
 Horace Walpole loved detailing the huge debts of some of the elite. He notes how the young
Lord Foley and his brother had run up debts of £220,000 and Charles James Fox £100,000. The
Tale edition of the correspondence of Horace Walpole, 48 vols. ( 1 9 3 7 - 8 3 ) ; x x v i n , 3 9 2 ; x x m , 498—9.
33
 'English popular literature and the image of business, 1760-1790' (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1985), See also P. Lawson and j . Phillips, ' " Our execrable
banditti": perceptions of nabobs in mid-eighteenth century Britain', Albion, xvi, 3 (1984), 225-41.
34
 C. Moore , A full inquiry into the subject of suicide, 2 vols. (1790) , 11, 358. See also R. Hey , A
dissertation on the pernicious effects of gambling (Cambridge, 1783).
36
 The correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. T . W . C o p e l a n d , 10 vols. (1958-78) , vn , 5 9 4 - 5 .
36
 Defoe had ' nothing of Merit to plead for... this Evil'; ' I lay it down as a state Rule, that to
this one Article of Retail-Credit, we owe almost all the Deficiencies of Trade, Bankrupt
Tradesmen, loss of Honour, and ill Compliance with Bills and Payments.' D. Defoe, Defoe's review,
reprinted in 22 vols. (New York, 1938), vi, 26, 15 Jan. 1706; vi, 33, 18 Jan. 1706. In 1788 Lord
Rawdon complained about 'that unbounded credit which was too promiscuously given...
tradesmen gave credit to those who had no right to expect it'. W. Cobbett (ed.), The parliamentary
history of England, 36 vols. (1806-20), xxvn, 549.
37
 This is discussed briefly in J. Hoppit, 'The use and abuse of credit in eighteenth-century
England', in R. B. Outhwaite and N. McKendrick (eds.), Business life and public policy: essays in
honour of D. C. Coleman (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 74—6.
38
 Patrick Colquhoun urged Pitt the Younger to tax pawnbrokers, putting their number at
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though the number of Jews in England increased from around 1,000 in 1700
to 20—26,000 in 1800.39 In the contemporary consciousness pawnbrokers and
Jewish moneylenders were guilty of the same 'crimes'. 'That pawnbrokers
anciently were, and now are composed of usurers, receivers of stolen goods,
Jews, and men of the worst principals and character is certain, and which the
proceedings of the courts... daily verify'.40 One writer likened pawnbrokers to
' an English Jew, that lives and grows fat on Fraud and Oppression... whose
Practise out-vies Usury...His shop, like Hellgates, is always open'.41
Pawnbrokers and Jewish moneylenders were disliked on two counts, only the
first of which is relevant here: that they charged usurious rates of interest and
that they were frequently receivers of stolen goods. Despite a statutory limit on
the interest rates they could charge of 20 per cent per annum, set in 1756, at
the end of the eighteenth century Colquhoun thought pawnbrokers could
manufacture returns of up to 300 per cent on their loans though, more
conservatively, The Times put the figure at between 40 and 150 per cent.42
Jewish moneylenders were, of course, victims of a general anti-semitism as well
as complaints over their extortionate dealings.43 Horace Walpole was disgusted
that 'Our Jews and usurers contrive to lounge at home, and commit as much
rapine as Lord Clive!>44 Jewish moneylenders were frequently satirized in
prints in the second half of the eighteenth century, usually portrayed
squeezing high rates of interest from desperate borrowers.45 In one double-
edged print, 'Two to one, or an attempt to outwit the young pawnbroker'
(1793?), Pitt the younger was criticized over his attempts to raise loans by
being depicted as a pawnbroker trying to avoid the sharp dealings of Jews in
his shop.46
Although these attacks on personal credit and moneylenders were
significant, concern over trade credit dominated discussion of private credit in
the eighteenth century and became particularly frequent from 1770. Again,
London, Public Record Office (P.R.O.), 30/8/272, fo. 288. See also M. Margaret,' Plan for a tax
on pawnbrokers', P.R.O., 30/8/274, fo. 171.
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4 1
 [W. Winstanley]. Four for a penny: or, poor Robin's character of an unconscionable pawn-broker
(1678).
42
 30 George I I , c. 2 ; C o l q u h o u n , ' A p lan for raising a r e v e n u e ' , fo. 287; The Times, 11 J u l y
1788, p .2 .
43
 Generally, J . Israel, European Jewry in the age of mercantilism 1550-1750 (Oxford, 1985), ch. 1;
T . E n d e l m a n , The Jews of Georgian England 1714-1830 (Phi ladelphia , 1979), pp . 30, 99-104 .
44
 Walpole's correspondence, x x i v , 231 , 11 Aug . 1776; see also p . 235 for ano the r outburs t of ant i-
semitism. For a m o r e measured and friendly react ion, Horace Walpole's memoirs, ed. J . Brooke (3
vols., N e w H a v e n , 1985), 1, 238 -9 .
46
 T w o articles by A. R u b e n s repr ints some of these po r t r aya l s : ' Por t ra i t of Anglo-Jewry
1656-1836 ' , Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society, x ix (1955-9) , ' 3 ~ 5 2 a n d 'Anglo-Jewry in
car ica ture 1780-1850 ' , Transactions ofthe Jewish Historical Society, x x m (1969-70) , 9 6 - 1 0 1 . By way
of example see ' F - bor ing money ou t of a J e w ' ( 1 7 8 4 ) and ' M o n e y l e n d e r s ' (1784) in F. G.
Shepherd and M . D . George (eds.), Catalogue of political and personal satires, 11 vols. (1870-1954) ,
vi , 148, 199.
46
 Shepherd a n d George , Catalogue, v n , 25. O n the same theme see ' T h e political p a w n brokers '
(1793), by Cruickshank, in Shepherd and George , Catalogue, vn , 25.
ATTITUDES TO CREDIT 315
financial crises provided the critics with their opening, crises which became
fairly common events after 1772 as credit creation intermingled with economic
growth to produce alternating periods of quickening advance and severe
temporary setbacks. During crises there was a general loss of confidence, both
among those directly involved in credit networks and among the concerned
onlookers.47 Critics associated trade credit (book debts, bills of exchange and
accommodation notes most commonly) with recklessness and extravagance.
Using credit enabled businessmen to trade on a far greater scale than their
own limited capital allowed, enabling opportunities to be brought within
reach. But easy credit conditions, it was argued, tempted businessmen,
particularly young ones and schemers, to lunge at risky openings, where the
chances of great profits were counterbalanced by the magnified chances of
failure. The gambling spirit was encouraged. As The Times reported, in the
middle of the 1788 financial crisis, ' In a commercial country, like England,
where speculation has no legal check, and paper credit far exceeds the real
wealth of those in trade, failures must be very common.>48 Gambling, not
judicious risk taking, was inextricably linked to trade credit, for 'it is hard to
restrain the young trader, where the advantage stands in view and the danger
out of sight; large profits are baits to the avaricious, who adventure on remote
traffic to accumulate... a fortune soon; but, alas, it frequently turns out a mere
delusion, and brings on the trader's ruin. '49
Traders also utilised unhealthy amounts of credit, the critics believed, by
being driven on by vanity, social emulation and ambitious, ostentatious wives.
Sinking deeper and deeper in debt and, through their new lifestyle, paying less
and less attention to their businesses, failure was inevitable.50 But the link
between credit and luxury in this scheme was censured not just because it led
to debt and failure but, significantly, because it created an illusion of substance
and allowed the erosion of traditional patterns of social hierarchy. As Moore
put it, echoing some of the earlier complaints about the consequences of the
rise of the national debt, 'Ancient distinctions are therefore much con-
founded.'51 Goldsmith complained of the 'pride and luxury of the middling
class of people; their eager desire of being seen in a sphere far above their
capacities and circumstances'.52 For critics, businessmen using credit were
liable to the same mistakes and sins (folly, hope, avarice, extortion and luxury)
that afflicted the stockjobbers and bubble blowers in the worlds of corporate
47
 See H o p p i t , ' F i n a n c i a l c r i ses ' a n d Risk and failure in English business, p p . 1 3 0 - 9 .
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and public credit between 1690 and 1735. The way out was justice, fairness |
and honesty; character and morality were central. Not surprisingly, therefore, ';
clerical opprobrium was heaped on businessmen to try to restrain malevolent •:•
passions and to encourage probity and industry.53 %
I I I
A set of common issues preoccupied critics of public, corporate and private
credit. Gambling, irresponsibility, extortion, usury, avarice and excessive
ambition were all seen as intimately and inevitably connected to the extensive
and intensive use of credit. In short, a new amorality was perceived as being
part and parcel of the credit economy. Consequently, the social fabric was
being eroded as new and unpredictable forces were unleashed. To the critics,
credit might be able to relieve short-term problems, but it created even larger
long-term ones. Such accusations did not go uncontested and replies took two
main forms: that the economic and political benefits of credit were much more
important than the misbehaviour of a few unrepresentative rogues and,
second, that the successful use of credit actually depended upon good not bad
conduct, that to get credit depended on behaving creditably.
In June 1694 John Hough ton put forward a defence of corporate financiers,
arguing that though there were undoubtedly some sharp dealers not everyone
should be tarred with the same brush. He believed that without the joint-stock
device productive ideas would not get off the drawing board and that,
consequently, the economy would founder and stagnate. This was particularly
the case with capital intensive industries such as glass making. To him the
financial requirements needed to enhance the prospects of growth were far
more important and pressing than the roguery of a few speculators.5* He
pointed to a range of industries where corporate credit had proved invaluable,
boosting both output and employment.
The exploitation of public credit was defended by a number of authors.
Some simply argued that there was no alternative to the national debt if just
wars were to be fought and won. The arguments of those who wanted to pay
for such wars by increasing current income or drawing on reserves never made
very much headway.55 Even early on in the life of the national debt, some of
its critics appreciated its usefulness. 'The national Debt was contracted in
53
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Defence of our Liberties and Properties, and for the Preservation of our most
excellent Constitution from Popery and Slavery. This encouraged the best Subjects
at the Revolution to venture their Lives and Fortunes in maintaining a long and
expensive War\bi Davenant can be taken as an example here, for he did not
object to the debt per se, just a large and permanent national debt. As he put
it, ' The funds for interest were, perhaps, good expedients for the time, to raise
money, but, if made use of frequently, may produce very bad effects in the
nation.'"
There were, of course, more active defences of public credit, pointing
beyond success in war and the failure of the Jacobite plots. In particular it was
argued that far from the national debt robbing trade, industry and agriculture
of money it actually drew idle funds into circulation, thereby enhancing
economic activity. To one author the funds had 'proved a means of throwing
vast Sums into Trade', for another the national debt was better thought of
as 'forming a national bank\is Others built on this to argue that because the
national debt was owed to other members of society the idea of a national
bankruptcy was inconceivable. As one writer in 1720 put it 'All the difference
between the private Man and the State is this, the private man may be ruin'd,
and all his Property seiz'd, the State cannot be in this condition.'59 It was
further argued, moreover, that this increase in the circulation of money not
only helped directly to fund productive investment, it also helped indirectly by
leading to a fall of interest rates. As Gale put it, 'the regular influx of money
into the hands of the bankers (and lenders) naturally produced a decrease in
the rate of interest. '60 Undeniably, by the middle of the eighteenth century
interest rates had fallen. In the 1690s the government borrowed at average
rates of interest of a little over 8 per cent (when the usury laws were at 6 per
cent); by the 1750s the rates were down to 3 or 4 per cent (the usury laws were
then at 5 per cent) .61 Such a fall was widely acknowledged and was generally
seen as beneficial. As Hume remarked, 'Nothing is esteemed a more certain
sign of the flourishing condition of a nation than the lowness of interest: and
with reason' for 'interest is the barometer of the State, and its lowness is a sign,
almost infallible, of the flourishing condition of a people.'62 Most credit being
66
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used after, say, 1730, could be obtained at reasonable rates, usually below the,
legal maximums set by the usury laws. Consequently, the charge of usury by'
the critics had force only in relation to loans by desperate borrowers. •
In private credit there were few defences of pawnbrokers, but one author]
pointed out that they 'Supply the Poor with small Sums' sufficient to keep;
households going through difficult times, that the rates of interest were!
reasonable given the poor quality of the security attached to the loans and*
that, finally, ' The private Pawnbrokers do cause, perhaps, a Million of Money ;
to circulate in the Channels of Trade; which otherwise, would be locked up i
in the public Funds; or, what may be much worse, fall into the Hands of af
Charitable Corporation.'*3 .•
Trade credit was fully justified, largely because it was seen as absolutely i
essential to the normal conduct of business, because of the shortage of money,.»
delays in payment of contracts and its role as venture capital. Its i
indispensibility was stressed time and again. To John Cary credit was 'as |
necessary to a Trading Nation, as Spirits are to the Circulation of the Blood ~\.
in the Body natural'.64 The corrupt Charitable Corporation defended its i
business by rightly declaring 'That there is a constant occasion for credit, '
especially in a Trading country, no one that is the most negligent observer of ;
Mankind can doubt.'85 To Defoe, 'Credit of Trade, which I call Money's $
Younger Sister, because its her Second in Trade, in many Cases, and on many ;
Occasions, stands in her room, supplies her place, and her Absence, for a time, \
Answers all the Ends of Money.' Such arguments were not by themselves a J
sufficient defence though, given the almost equally widely held opinion that ^
credit encouraged reckless risk-taking and the accumulation of heavy debts. ;
Defenders of trade credit had to attempt to draw a line between its ••
reasonable and its unreasonable use. Defoe, developing ideas from his own •'•
unhappy business experiences, was one of the first to attempt this.66 To him, \
trade credit needed to be used carefully and selectively. Disaster would result i
if it was used in ignorance, without skill or in the wrong circumstances, j
Second, he realized that legal provisions surrounding the giving of credit and
the contraction of debts had to be fair and just, offering encouragement to
worthy enterprise but sufficient coercion to debtors to provide real power in -
case of default. He campaigned hard in the Review for the new and more .;
generous bankruptcy law in 1706 for example. Next he categorically attacked •.
the actions of rogues misusing credit, be they corrupt merchants, the East India >:
Companies in 1701, stockjobbers or the bubbles of 1719.67 Finally, and most =
63
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critically, he showed how trade credit linked to good character, to creditable
people. As he put it, credit' will keep Company with none but the Industrious,
the Honest, the Laborious, and such, whose Genius, the Bent of their Lives,
tends to Maintain her good Opinion', a belief he was later to apply directly
to public credit.68 He stressed that a state, a businessman, a landlord or a
labourer could command credit only if they fitted a widely held pattern of
good behaviour, including not only economy, hard work and ability but also
the circumscription of passions such as avarice and luxury. Consequently his
position with regard to all credit, not just trade credit, was very flexible,
allowing economic and financial costs and benefits to be weighed alongside
more intangible social standards. In the end, credit went to the creditable.
Defoe's ideas on the link between credit and creditable behaviour were
developed by a number of other authors through the eighteenth century. The
Spectator thought that to a trader credit is 'what Honour, Reputation, Fame,
or Glory is to other Sort of Men'.69 In 1717 it was observed that 'To support
and maintain a Mans Private Credit, 'tis absolutely necessary that the World
have a fixt Opinion of the Honesty and Integrity, as well as Ability of a Person.
If there be good Reason to Object against the One or the Other of These, his
Credit sinks, no one choose to deal with him, nor does any one care to trust
him.'70 To the True Briton, looking at public credit,
there must be an Appearance of Honesty at least, to raise this Credit to any considerable
Height, so as to be lasting. The People or Nation that are Ambitious of it, should bear
the nicest Reputation in the world; They must be Men of Morals and Manners; of
Honour and Integrity; Wisdom and Penetration; Fidelity, and Impartiality, and have
every commendable Quality which embellishes Mankind71
To Sir James Steuart credit was inextricably part of sociability: ' Credit,
therefore, is no more than well established confidence between men, in what
relates to the fulfilling of their engagements. This confidence must be
supported by laws, and established by manners. By laws, the execution of
formal contracts may be enforced: manners, alone, can introduce that entire
confidence which is requisite to form the spirit of a trading nation.'72 To these,
and to many others, people earned credit by hard work and good behaviour.
Furthermore, if superficial appearances might fool creditors for a brief while
their own self interest made them shrewd judges in the end.
In theory, through not always in practice, credit was given to the most
worthy, the most assiduous and the most honourable. But it could easily be lost
if virtue was replaced by vice. Indeed the fickleness of credit was legendary for
it could come and go violently and unexpectedly, providing major problems
48
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to those trying to maintain a steady state of liquidity. To critics this provided ;
a further opportunity to launch an attack. Swift noted that 'To hear some of j
these worthy Reasoners talking of Credit; that she is so nice, so squeamish, so :
capricious; you would think they were describing a Lady troubled with j
Vapours or the Cholick, to be only removed by a Course of steel, or swallowing '•
a Bulletl'.73 In this argument, credit was chimerical and ludicrous, almost
completely divorced from the real world and real values. But in a sense this ;*
missed the force of the point Defoe was making, or at least got hold of the •
wrong end of the stick. For Defoe and others had argued that to use credit I
well meant conforming precisely to those virtues that Swift held so dear :
himself.74 It was deeply rooted in good society, indeed it sprouted from ancient '
and generally held values not new transient ones. I
IV f
A restricted range of issues concerned the critics of the development of all types I
of credit in England between 1680 and 1790. They were worried about the %:
ways in which its increasing use contributed to unworthy and unstable risk- f
taking (speculation and gambling), unjust prices, luxury, social dislocation, \
indebtedness and usury. They denied the possibility of successfully integrating {
credit within a framework of acceptable behaviour. For those critics, the i
standards to be applied in judging credit were more moral and spiritual than
economic and material. Credit appeared to them to be a Trojan horse,
promising well but in fact catastrophically breaching the walls of a harmonious
and moral order. It embodied destructive forces, in the form of new aspirations
and values, without offering much of substance in its place. If it was used to
promote political and economic success then to the critics those successes were
connected to far too many failings. To them the price too often included
violent short-run fluctuations, intensified uncertainties and new patterns of
unacceptable behaviour. Society might prosper for a while, but in the long run
the use of credit could only produce decay.
Such criticisms were met in two main ways. First that credit had to be used
if the nation was to be victorious in war and prosperous in peace. The world
was changing and Britain had to change with it or perish. This was an
important argument, moreover, because by implication it recognized that the
critics were relatively committed to a stagnant state (politically and
economically), or at least progress that was painfully slow. Second, that to
use credit successfully actually depended upon behaving creditably. Only
those with probity and industry flowing in their veins could hope to command
credit, be they governments, businessmen, farmers or consumers. Far from
undermining old values, the use of credit acutally confirmed them. But even
73
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the enthusiasts admitted that credit could and was exploited desperately,
foolishly and criminally by certain stockjobbers, moneylenders and pawn-
brokers. Through the idea of usury, sprinkled with a pinch of bigotism, such
men showed many just where the dividing line between acceptable and
unacceptable credit lay. It was acceptable when it brought about public
benefit, be it success in war, or employment and efficiency in agriculture, trade
and industry. It was unacceptable when in the hands of the vain and
ambitious, foreigners, oppressors or self-interested speculators.
Reactions to credit show one way in which a traditional moral order fused
with economic, political and administrative developments. Those reactions
were forged over the fire of innovation, experiment and uncertainty, for
Britain's rise to greatness and its industrial revolution were not clearly seen
and identified as they were happening. Consequently, credit's role was met as
much by conservatism as enthusiasm. On both sides of the divide it was judged
more by old standards than new ones and was confronted not by novel ideas
and theories but by ancient ones. Hume implied that such conservatism was
common at this level of discourse:
The greater part of mankind may be divided into two classes; that of shallow thinkers,
who fall short of the truth; and that of abtruse thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter
class are by far the most rare; and, I may add, by far the most useful and valuable.
They suggest hints at least, and start difficulties, which they want perhaps skill to
pursue, but which may produce fine discoveries when handled by men who have a
more just way of thinking. At worst, what they say is uncommon; and if it should cost
some pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleasure of hearing something that
is new.75
Much of the discussion of credit between 1680 and 1790 used ideas that were
old and well worn, for the central battle between on one side economic change
and the logic of market forces and, on the other, convention and perceptions
of traditional society had been going on for centuries. The Scholastics, for
example, had discussed a strikingly similar range of problems in the medieval
period. Their economics centrally involved attempts to comprehend and
evaluate evolving market transactions, judging developments by notions of
right and justice that 'had its foundation in the Christian synthesis that
combined elements from the Scriptures and authentic Church teaching,
Aristotelian philosophy, Roman and Canon Law, and especially reason and
natural law.76 The shallow thinkers who have been examined here show clearly
just how important the natural law tradition remained to a consideration of
one economic issue in the eighteenth century. The Scholastics, like those who
discussed credit in the eighteenth century, were especially concerned with
equity as the central problem in economics.77 Such analyses had not been killed
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off by the revolutions of the seventeenth century, or by some supposed
deification of the capitalist ethic, possessive individualism and property.78
After the Restoration, more particularly after 1688, it was Britain's turn,
following the Dutch, to come to terms with the 'embarrassment of riches'.79
The ideas used were very similar to those used by the Dutch, just as the Dutch
in turn had drawn from the well of the Christian humanist tradition. But it is
also worth stressing that these old analytical structures were not killed off by
new ideas about value in the, writings of Adam Smith.80 Indeed, recent
historians examining the so-called 'Adam Smith problem' (reconciling The
theory of moral sentiments with the Wealth of nations) have shown how some of
Smith's ideas fitted into the traditions which have been uncovered in this
article. Economic discourse operated at too many (admittedly interrelated)
levels for Hume's abstruse thinkers to ' win' quickly or surely over the shallow
ones.
Awareness of growth and development are integral parts of our con-
sciousness and removing them to allow a balanced study of eighteenth-century
England is one of the most difficult tasks to set the historical imagination. It
is far easier for historians than it was for contemporaries to comprehend the
meaning and significance of the political and economic changes in that
century, to view those changes as 'progressive' and to adopt the long-run
view. What an examination of attitudes to credit in Britain between 1680 and
1790 shows is that developments were met by ideas that were more often
backward than forward looking. It was those older ideas which provided the
central principles in the elite's consciousness of economic change and made
them so hesitant in extolling its benefits - even if materially they themselves
were reaping rich rewards. Of course they did not naively celebrate the old
order, they knew well enough its faults, but they were not prepared blindly to
underwrite new developments. Change had to be assessed, its virtues and vices
weighed. But the standards employed were overwhelmingly practical and
traditional rather than abstract, secular and materialist.
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